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Universität Siegen

Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht

Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge


Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig

Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral costeffective action

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes.

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